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Redefining Puerto Rico's Political Status
Pedro Caoon*

Almost four decades after the U.S. government announced to the
United Nations that Puerto Rico had ceased to be a colony, Congress
reconsidered the country's political status. In 1989, the lOlst Congress
initiated a legislative process that was designed to produce a bill to authorize
a referendum on the political status of Puerto Rico. Although status-related
legislative activity continued into the 102nd Congress, no bill

was ever

drafted. The House and Senate draft bills would have called on the people
of Puerto Rico to express their preference for one of three options: 1)

independence, 2) annexation into the Union as the 51st state, or 3) redefini

tion of the current Commonwealth arrangement. The most significant feature
of the proposed legislation was explicit language calling for the implemen
tation of the preferred option.
Although Puerto Rico's political-juridical status has been the subject of

congressional scrutiny and debate since as far back as 1898, the current
referendum process is unique because it is the fll'St time since 1917 that

Congress has taken a lead in defining the nature of Puerto Rico's status.

Congressional interest in reworking the colonial formula appears at a partic
ularly dynamic period in world histoxy. Seemingly unrelated geopolitical and
international economic developments bear directly on the issue of Puerto
Rico's probable decolonization1 and suggest answers to why the U.S. gov
ernment has finally decided to revisit the colonial question.

• I would like to thank Angelo Falc6n, Edgardo Mel&xlez, Jose Sanchez, and Rosalie
Mornles Keams for their comments. This is an expanded and updated version of "Reworking
the Colonial Formula: Puerto Rico into the Twenty-F11'5t Century," which appeared in Radical
America 23, no. 1 Qan.-Feb. 1989):9-20.
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U.S. colonial policy toward Puerto Rico has historically been propelled
by two considerations: utilizing Puerto Rico's strategic location in a region of
aitical geopolitical significance, and securing a favorable investment climate
for U.S. business. Since the end of World War II, Puerto Rico has been
promoted as a bulwark against the spread of communism in the Caribbean,
and its shores have been used as a base for U.S. militaxy intervention in the
region.This perception has gradually changed, however, with the end of the
Cold War, the reversals of socialist and social-democratic regimes in Central
and Latin America, and widespread popular skepticism about the notion that
communism breeds revolution in the region.

agement of Puerto Rico is not new. What is new is Congress's explicit
commitment to resolve the vexing problem of Puerto Rico's political status.
In

this chapter, I discuss the relationship between Puerto Rico's Com

monwealth status and economic growth in the post-war period. I examine
the attempts by the PPD, or

Partido Popular Democratico, repeated since

the late 1940s, to gain more autonomous powers for the insular government
and the declining relevance of the colonial relationship for U.S. business. I

conclude with a review of the legislative process during the 101st Congress
and examine the aitical issues that framed Congress's debates on the future
of Puerto Rico.

Puerto Rico has been an extremely profitable base of operations for
U.S.business.1hree periods have been particularly important in the counlly's
twentieth-century economic growth, all characterized by export-oriented
industries producing for the U.S. market: 1) a sugar-based economy under
the control of absentee corporations, 2) U.S.-led labor-intensive manufactur

�g in �pparel and t�e products, and 3) most recently, large-scale capital
mtensJ.ve pharmaceutical and electronics
and sophisticated financial

firms

and commu�cations services under the control of global enterprises. How

The Commonwealth and the economics of colonialism
Puerto Rico's political status is defined by Public Law 600 (PL 6oO) and
the Puerto Rico Federal Relations Act it created. PL 600 went into effect on

July 3, 1950, and authorized the government in Puerto Rico to draft a
constitution and establish a republican form of government. The PPD, the

ever, with the passing of each phase, the U.S. government has been com

party in power at the time, was a major force in bringing this project to fruition.

pell�d to �sume
ev�r larger role in sustaining Puerto Rico's economy,
playmg an mcreasmgly unportant role in sustaining social welfare, govern

is in line with the policy of the Government to provide, the largest possible

�

ment operations, and industrial production. Moreover, given the nature of
�e economic growth that is taking place, congressional aitics are question
mg whether the prevailing relationship is still necessary to attract U.S.
investments.2
The current congressional debates on the future political status of
Puerto Rico occur in the context of a less threatening geopolitical climate but
� increasingly volatile international economic scene. Seldom explicitly

discussed, but always on the minds of policy -makers, is whether the colony
of Puerto Rico is still essential to preserve the geopolitical and economic
interests of the United States. Complicating these discussions is the realizaton
that Puerto Rico is plagued by a series of social, eco11-omic, and political
maladies that will likely remain unattended under the prevailing political
status. Clearly, events in Washington leave little doubt that the U.S. govern
ment considers the prevailing relationship deficient and in need of serious
revision. Accordingly, debates between Congress and the Executive Branch
have been guided by two sets of concerns-whether decolonization will
co �promise U.S. national security and undermine the profitability of U.S.

busmess, and whether the prevailing status can be reworked into a more

cost-efficient and politically manageable relationship.Crisis in colonial man-

The U.S. Senate Committee that wrote the legislation reasoned "that it
measure of local self-government for people who are under the flag of the
United States."3 'f!le legislation was widely promoted as a fundamental
restructuring of the colonial relationship to permit Puerto Ricans to manage
their domestic political economy. Yet the same committee emphasized that
the new bill did not diminish the island's subordination to the federal
government: "The measure would not change Puerto Rico's fundamental
political, social, and economic relationship to the United States."4

On March 3, 1952, 47 percent of registered voters in Puerto Rico

approved a constitution. Approximately 20 p�rcent of the voters rejected that
constitution, while independence forces boycotted the referendum. The
"Commonwealth," known in Spanish as the

''Estado Libre Asociado" (EIA),

was proclaimed on July 25, 1952, and presented to the world as a new
political entity with autonomous powers over domestic affairs-ostensibly
the end of colonialism for Puerto Rico. However, the U.S, grant of self-gov
ernment was provisional, since " ... [C]onstitutionally, Congress may repeal
Public Law 600, annul the Constitution of Puerto Rico and veto any insular
legislation which it deems unwise or improper. From the perspective of
constitutional law the compact between Puerto Rico and Congress may be
unilaterally altered by the Congress."5
While PL 600 was an important element of Puerto Rico's favorable
in�estment climate, it did not affect economic regulations that were originally
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set up in 1900 through the Foraker Act In fact, the essential measures that

attracted U.S. investments in manufacturing and which locked the country's

economy into· the metropolitan network of production and trade were in .
place well before the establishment of the Commonwealth. Exemptions from

federal taxation, a common monetary system, inclusion in the U.S. Customs

area, provisions for the collection and return of excise taxes, access to U.S.

financial markets, special treatment under federal tax laws, insular maritime

OnJanuruy 19, 1953, the United States unilaterally removed Puerto Rico
from the United Nations list of non-self-governing tenitories, and obtained a

permanent exemption from having to submit annual reports on the country's

soda! and economic conditions to the Secretary General. Puerto Ricans, the

United States told the world, had freely chosen through open democratic
elections to retain their long-standing association with the United States. The

nature of this compact of mutual association was, and continues to be, legally

legislation, partial exemption from the Fair Labor Standards Act, prohibitions

and politically obscure. However, the ELA was pronounced as being inter

individuals and the public bureaucracy, and application of Taft-Hartley

Constitution of the United States. The PPD joined U.S. policy-makers in a

against commercial treaties with foreign nations, direct federal transfers to

legislation were on the books before 1952. The federal government retained

control over monetary and trade policy and kept the original Foraker Act

provisions that authorized the colonial administration to establish a tax
system.

Nonetheless, PL 600 was significant because it created a set of social

institutions and arrangements that enhanced the prospects for long-term

corporate investments and profitability. In the process, it established a

political and economic environment that accelerated Puerto Rico's integra

tion into the U.S. economy as a low-wage manufacturing center. Although

the structure of colonial rule was preserved, the colonial state was given the

requisite autonomy to devise planning and social polides consistent with the

requirements of a new and more advanced phase of capitalist development

The creation of the ELA is best understood in the context of domestic

and international politico-economic developments in the immediate post

war era, when dominant political forces- in the colony, intent on preserving
their hegemony, sought alliance with U.S. capital and metropolitan state

interests.6 The national and international attention lavished on Puerto Rico

coqverted that little-known and poveity-stricken country into the center of

"freedom and power in the Caribbean."7

While th� ELA presetVed the structure of colonial rule, it also gave

government officials in Puerto Rico the necessary autonomy and flexibility
to promote a new model of accumulation. For potential investors, Puerto

Rico loomed as a new tropical investment paradise, replete with political

stability, low wages and a compliant government. Puerto Rico was an ideal

investment site for these firms for two reasons. First, Puerto Rico was
exempted from federal regulations over industrial labor relations, wage

nally self-governing and sovereign over those matters not prohibited by the

campaign to mystify the country's colonial status. The ELA was part of a

strategy to mitigate international criticism of the United States as a colonial

power and to authenticate the U.S. crusade for post-war global decoloniza
tion. Since 1952, the United States has tried to convince an increasingly
skeptical·global community that Puerto Rico is not a colony.8

The PPD, under the leadership of Luis Mufi.oz Marin (its founder and

first elected governor of Puerto Rico), was a major force behind this symbolic

change in the colonial formula. Originally formed in the late 1930s as an

anti-imperialist populist movement, the PPD readily dominated Puerto Rico's

political scene for nearlythree decades: But by 1948, PPD offidals abandoned
their goal of independence and called upon the people of Puerto Rico to

support a program of economic integration into the United States through a

refurbished colonial formula. The PPD's decision to abandon independence

and intensify the country's subordination to the metropolitan economy was

seen in some sectors as a betrayal, which many believe predpitated the

nationalist uprisings of the 1950s.

In the bipolar post-war world, conceived of by U.S. legislators in terms

of preserving national security in the face of ?oviet expansion, there was little
patience in Congress for an independent, conceivably social-democratic,

regime in the Caribbean. The PPD leadership recognized this and consoli

dated its emerging hegemony by legitimizing the objectives of a U.S. foreign
policy that was predi�ted on suffocating national liberation struggles

throughout the world. In their eyes, Puerto Rico stood as a shining example

of tlie economic and sodal gains that could be achieved by the third world
through dependent capitalist development, and political subordination to
the United States.

policy, environmental quality, and other areas·. Second, ELAretained the most

economically attractive features of the colonial relationship-federal tax

credits and exemption from taxation, duty-free access to U.S. markets, and

monetary stability. In the immediate post-war period Puerto Rico virtually
guaranteed U.S. business the

22

highest profit rates in the hemisphere.

COLONIAL DILEMMA

'Perfecting the Commonwealth'
The redefined colonial relationship did not represent the culmination

of the PPD's efforts to rework the terms of Puerto Rico's subordination. On
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the contrary, it was the foundation upon which the PPD would pressure the
federal govermnent for enhanced autonomy in order to "perfect" the Com
monwealth relation.
1hroughout the 1950s and 1960s, the PPD lobbied the federal govern
ment in a failed effo rt to obtain increased decision-making powers, particu
larly over those areas that affected economic performance. The PPD had two
goals which, if successful, would have also prevented its most serious
political opposition, the statehood movement, from emerging as a viable
alternative: first, to sustain an internationally favorable investment climate for
foreign capital; second, to fortify its own domestic political base. The gradual
expansion of Puerto Rico's autonomous powers was seen by the PPD
leadership as essential to achieve both goals. With increased decisional
capadty over economic matters, Pllerto Rico would continue to respond to
the needs of U.S. business and thus promote growth. Congressional approval
for amendments to the Federal Relations Act would also enhance the
standing of the PPD and convince the electorate that ELA was a permanent
solution to Puerto Rico's uncertain political identity. With the necessary
corre,ctives, the PPD seemed to argue, Puerto Rico would be spared from
eventually having to choose between statehood and independence.
Mufioz Marin developed a particular conception of the Estado Libre
Asociadobased on the prindples of compact and consent between two equal
peoples. According to a State Department study authored by Arthur Borg,
Mufioz Marin argued
In approving the law (PL 600) and submitting it to the Puerto
Rican people, Congress was asking them to consent to its
taking effect. If they gave it their approval, the argument ran,
the result would be that the Puerto Rican constitution and the
new Federal Relations Act would be legitimized by the con
sent of the Puerto Rican people.9

·

ll

I

By 1959MufiozMarin hadfurther developed the concept of"compact."
He noted, "The idea of compact determines a basic change in the relation
ship. It takes away from the very basis of the relationship the nature and onus
of colonialism. It cannot be revoked or changed unilaterally."10 dearly the
problem with all of this was that the formulation was only in Mufioz Marin's
mind, since Congress had not legislated away its constitutional powers over
tenitorial matters, and specifically over Puerto Rico. In passing PL 6oo,
Congress was merely expanding the range of Puerto Rico's powers over local
self-govermnent.
OnMarch 23, 1959, less than seven years after the proclamation ofELA,
Puerto Rico's Resident Commissioner introduced legislation in Congress to
alter and clarify PL 6oo.11 But the persistent congressional opposition to the
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implidt claim of sovereignty contained in the bill forced the PPD to substitute
a substantially revised bill in September 1959. The new measure was sub
jected to intense congressional scrutiny, detailed studies by Executive Branch
agendes, and wide-ranging debate in public hearings..The public hearings
revealed the absence of consensus among Puerto Rico's political leadership
on what type of changes should be effected in the colonial relationship. The
U.S. govermnent also opposed any changes in legislation that restricted the
constitutionally defined prerogatives of the federal govermnent to regulate
Puerto Rican affairs. After two years of legislative activity, Congress failed to
act on the measure, and it died quietly in early 1961.
1hroughout the 1960s, Mufioz Marin pursued his intellectual and
political campaign to lay the foundations for an expansion of EIA's autono
mous powers. However, even he could not leverage his considerable
international prestige and close personal ties with the Kennedy Administra
tion to amend PL 600. But he was able to obtain White House approval for
the establishment in 1964 of a U.S.-Puerto Rico Cormnission. The
Commission's work led to one of the most comprehensive reports on Puerto
Rico's status, and its members recommended holding a plebisdte. In 1967,
amid deteriorating economic conditions, growing popular appeal for the
statehood movement, and apparent U.S. impatience with lobbying for more
autonomy, Munoz Marin called for a plebisdte.
Unlike its predecessor in 1952, the 1967 referendum was not an
initiative by Congress, and thus ha&no legal force to affect relations.12 The
PPD antidpated oveiWhelming popular support for the Commonwealth
proposal, which would give it "the authorization to develop the Estado Libre
Asociado...to the maximum level of self-govermnent."13Moreover, the PPD
hoped the plebisdte results would solidify its electoral standing and ulti
mately convince Congress to grant the Commonwealth autonomous powers
over critical areas of the political economy. The 1967 plebisdte failed to
accomplish any of this; in fact, it intensified the divisions within the PPD, led
to the emergence of a younger and more sophisticated leadership in the
statehood movement (Partido Nuevo Progresista, or PNP), and contributed
to the PPD's electoral defeat in 1968.
In 1973 the PPD returned to office, and once again attempted to
resurrect its cherished dreams for "perfecting " the Commonwealth.Mufioz
Marin obtained presidential approval for a spedal commission to study
U.S.-Puerto Rican relations. That Commission's report was released in Octo
ber 1975 as the "Compact of Permanent Union" and recommet1Ped a
thorough restructuring of the colonial relationship. It called for granting
Puerto Rico the right to partidpate in international organizations, jurisdiction
over territory held by the United States, control over tariff and immigration

Redef:Lnlng
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policy, the right to enter into commercial treaties, exemption from the Federal
Fair Labor Standards Act, authority to regulate environmental quality stan
dards, and other recommendations for increased autonomy.
The report left no doubt that the Commonwealth status deprived the
insular administration of the miniinal policy tools needed to regulate Puerto
Rico's political economy. If the colonial formula were not reworked, the
report seemed to argue, Puerto Rico would relinquish its status as a center
for capital accumulation. The Compact was a plea by the PPD to the U.S.
government to grant the Commonwealth the flexibility it needed to respond
to the changing requirements of an emerging new economic order.
What the PPD feared most was that economic deterioration would
thwart its aspirations for re-establishing its political hegemony after its defeat
in the 1968 elections. But the Compact was not only linked to a new model
of capital accumulation and political dotl)inance, it also required a drastic
reduction in U.S. authority over its possession-something the federal gov
ernment rejected then and continues to resist.
During its four years in office (1973-1976), the PPD Administration led
,by Rafael Hernandez Col6n did not embark on a campaign to alter the status
of the island. Possibly lulled into thirrking that the PPD's loss to the statehood
party in 1968 was an aberration, Hernandez Col6n did not view the PNP as
a serious electoral threat. Although he set about to reintegrate disaffected
sectors of the traditional PPD coalition, his administration was forced to
contend with Puerto Rico's most serious recession since the post-war era. In
an.effort to counter the downturn, Hemandez Col6n imposed harsh eco
nomic measures, with the result that the PPD began to undermine its electoral
base. The PPD's inability to extricate the economy from the recession, along
with its unpopular austerity programs, set the stage for a victory by the PNP
in 1976. However, the elections of 1976 also proved the existence of
widespread underlying popular support for the statehood party, and thus
reinvigorated the dormant status issue.
After its sobering defeat, PPD strategists re-evaluated the party's elec
toral strategy in the context of a campaign to enhance the autonomous
powers of the Commonwealth. In 1978, the PPD introduced La Nueva Tesis.
its vision of a new federal relationship for Puerto Rico. Rafael Hernande
Colon wrote �t in order to confront the changing economic and social
demands of the 1980s, Puerto Rico required much greater "political authority
over its own life." He called for a number of changes in PL 600, including
increased insular control over labor-management relations, salaries and "all
the conditions of employment in our economy."14 La Nueva Tesiswas closely
patterned on the recommendations of the Compact of P ermanent Union.
However, it contained a withering attack against statehood, arguing that the

�
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resulting loss of tax benefits and increased reliance on federal support would
create dependency and lead to the destruction of Puerto Rico's nascent
middle class.15
The PPD was prepared to reactivate the status issue and to make it a
focal point of the 1980 elections. For the first time some of its leaders testified
before the United Nations Decolonization Committee and met with repre
sentatives of the Cuban delegation that had submitted a resolution supporting
Puerto Rico's right to self-determination. During the 1980 campaign the PPD
came under bitter criticism for its supposed alliance with the Cubans. This
collusion with the presumed enemy of Puerto Rico may have been decisive
in PPD's subsequent defeat.16
Romero Barcel6, the incumbent governor, campaigned in part on the
premise that if re-elected he would call for a referendum on Puerto Rico's
status in 1981. Both parties were staking their electoral futures on the belief
that the elections would finally determine Puerto Rico's status preference.
Yet the election results were indecisive. Although Romero Barcel6 was
elected governor, his margin of victory was the smallest in any of Puerto
Rico's general elections.17 With such a miniscule mandate, the PNP feared
possible rejection of the statehood option if a referendum was held. Not
surprisingly, Romero Barcel6 did not promote a status change during his
tenure. However, his administration was characterized by a bitter ideological
campaign against those sectors of society promoting autonomy and inde
pendence.18 Independence, socialist, and nationalisrforces in Puerto Rico
were readily labelled terroristic, and Romero's administration worked assid
uously to create the myth that they were closely allied to Cuba. The PPD
came under attack and its leadership was portrayed as suspect because of its
activities in the United Nations. Since the end of World War ll, Puerto Rico's
political leadership has effectively promoted fears of communist subversion
and Cuban intervention as a means to discredit independence forces. How
ever, what was striking 3:bout the Romero period was its virulence against
this sector, and its ideological affinit y with the Reagan era. Combatting
communism in Puerto Rico was, for the PNP, the equivalent of the Reagan
Administration's policy of confrontation with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas and
El Salvador's FDR-FMLN.

Section 936 and the 'new colonialism'
The post-World War II industrialization policy, known as Operation
Bootstrap, succeeded in large part because it guaranteed that Puerto Rico
would be a more profitable site than competing regional manufacturing
centers in the United States. Until the mid-1960s, this policy responded well
Redefining Puerto Rico's Pol itical Status
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Puerto Rico. Thus, the old system provided an incentive for fnms to liquidate

to the needs of U.S. capital, which was ovetwhehningly labor-intensive and

their operations at the expiration of the tax exemption period and to transfer

had relatively low capital requirements. Moreover, since these fnms imported

their accumulated profits to the booming and lucrative Eurodollar markets.

raw materials and semi-processed commodities from the United States and

Ostensibly Congress enacted Section 936 to halt these ab

re-eXported their finished products to metropolitan markets, the Puerto Rican

�s.

The impact of the new tax regime on the economy was dramatic.

� P:rrt

ee'onorny fo ed
of the U.S . network of commodity production, trade,
.
and money arculation. Puerto Rico was merely an extension of the metro

Multinational fnms in the pharmaceuticals, electronics, and precision instru

politan economy.

ments sector migrated in even larger numbers to the island. These 936

undergoing profound disruption. Policy-makers learned to their dismay that

its financial sector as well. By granting tax exemption on certain types of

mainland, but with the newly industrializing economies. As a result, the

aged the 936 corporations to retain their assets in Puerto Rico. In essence,

corporations transformed not only Puerto Rico's manufacturing sector, but

However, by the mid-1970s, the traditional structure of production was

Puerto Rico

earned interest deposited in domestic financial markets, Congress encour

was no longer competing solely with decaying regions in the

Congress created a complementary fund market to provide low-cost capital

traditional fnms, which were losing their competitive advantage, evacuated

for investment purposes.

Puerto Rico with alarming frequency.
Faced with a profound crisis in investor confidence and economic
deterioration, planning strategy was altered in response to the investment
needs of newer industries. These industries were concentrated in pharma

When combined with generous industrial incentives and subsidies,

including fiscal inducements, tax exemptions, and low wages, Section 936
converted Puerto Rico into an incredibly profitable investment site for

international conglomerates. In 1988, U.S.

ceutiCals, electronics, and specialized medical equipment industries, and
were ovetwhelmingly subsidiaries of multinational corporations. The goal

able to direct foreign investment activity.21 In the process, Puerto Rico's

was

of recreating a more favorable investment climate
behind Hernandez
Colon's decision in 1974 to form the Committee to Study Puerto Rico's
Finances. In 1975, the Committee presented its sobering analysis of the local

economy became excessively reliant on Section 936 corporations. Rather

than repatriating to the United States those profits that were eligible for tax

credits and where the net return on investments was not as great as in offshore

econ my.19 Its recommendations presaged the Reagan Administration's sup
.
ply-s1de philosophy. It called for eliminating those regulations that impeded
corporate profitability and for reduced public-sector financing of basic social
serVices. While the Committee endorsed the orthodox palliative that vibrant

�

banking sites, 936 corporations began to deposit their surplus profits in

Puerto Rican banks. By 1983, 41 percent of total commercial bank deposits

were attributable to these fnms and approximately one-third of the labor
force was either directly or indirectly dependent on these 936 corporations

economic growth would increase the aggregate social wage and lead to an
overall material improvement 'Of society, it argued that Puerto Rico lacked
.many of the policy instruments it needed in order to control the activities of

� �

m lti ational

firms

.
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for employment.22 As a direct outgrowth of936, Puerto Rico was increasingly
shifting its structure of capital accumulation from manufacturing to financial
services. One student of this process notes:

Moreover, its policy recommendations were an explicit

re,ectton of the more balanced growth and socially responsible perspective
of the PPD's La Nueva Tesis.

late 1970s, capital-rich, highly mobile, and technologically
.� �e firms
were moving their operations in large numbers to Puerto

sophisticated

Rico. They did so to utilize the skilled yet cheap labor, and to take advantage
of new industrial incentives. But they were also induced to invest in Puerto

Rico by generous federal tax credits. In 1976, Congress amended the tax
exemption policy for U.S.

firms with branches in Puerto Rico. The revised

tax code, known as Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code, permits

U.S. subsidiaries in Puerto Rico to repatriate profits to the United States and

rec

�e a federal tax credit. Under the previous law, firms were taxed if they

remtted accumulated profits while they continued to conduct business in

28
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firms in Puerto Rico realized profits

of $8.9 billion, or about 19.7 percent of their declared global profits attribut

t

The financial income of export manufacturing 936 corpora
tions became the fuel of the whole system. �illions of dollars
in global profits were transferred to or declared in export
manufacturing operations in Puerto Rico through a highly
complex and sophisticated international financial network. 23
The federal government is acutely aware of how important the Section

936 tax credit is to employment and investment in the island, and knows that
"a ph ase-out of Section 936 would cause economic dislocation in Puerto

Rico."24 Nonetheless, in its annual reports on the "possessions corporation

system of taxation," the Treasury Department argues that Section 936 is a

giveaway for the multinational corporations that results in billions of dollars

in lost revenue for the federal government. Since 1976, the Treasury has

Redefining Puerto Rico's Pol itical Stotus
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periodically tried so-persuade Congress to rescind the credit as a way of
reducing the federal deficit. Only because of a monumental lobbying effo rt

by the ppr)> its congressional allies and the Puerto Rico-U.SA Foundation.25

ps'the Tre�ry's 1985 campaign to abolish the credit defeated. But the
Treasury, with its revenue-enhancing allies in Congress, has enacted mea
sures that have offset the tax benefits of Secti6n 936.

The implications of this squabbling are theoretically significant. The

federal government and U.S. fums are clearly divided as to the benefits and

cost!> of sustaining Puerto Rico as a colony. Certain developments indicate
the growing influence of the fmance sector on the Puerto Rican economy.
U.S. multinational banks and financial and investment firms have rapidly
exp?flded their operations to Puerto Rico and are increasingly financing
regional development projects. In addition, the insular government has
enacted legislation to convert Puerto Rico into an offshore banking site. This
sector of capital is less reliant on Section 936, cheap labor, and the economic
benefits of colonialism than the multinational corporations now engaged in
production. But periodic congressional review of Section 936 leaves little

doubt that the enormous benefits acauing to the manufacturing-finance
multinational corporations are also perceived as somehow detrimental to the
fmancial well-being of the U.S. economy.
Puerto Rico has become one of the most profitable assembly, packag
ing, and testing platforms in the world for multinational firms and has evolved
into an important offshore banking site as well. But this high-end economic
growth has not mitigated the deplorable social and economic conditions that

plague Puerto Rico. Puerto Rico's per capita income is less than one-third that
of the United States ($5,157 in 1988, or about 47 percent of the per capita
income of Mississippi,. the poorest state); unemplbyment unofficially strikes
about 25 percent of the labor force; and labor participation rates are extremely

low, about 41 percent

"'

According to a recent U.S. government report, "Chronic high poverty
rates persist in Puerto Rico."26 In 1979, nearly two-thirds of Puerto Rico's
population earned incomes below the federal poverty level. Puerto Rico is
acutely dependent upon the federal government to sustain consumption and
the operations of the government In 1988 federal �ers to Puerto Rico
reached almost $6 billion, which accounted for 21 percent of the island's

personal income and31 percent of the Commonwealth government's annual

receipts. Illiteracy afflicts 11 percent of the population, af!d thus shatters the

)1

prospects for much of the population to participate in the more sophisticated,
evolving economy. The Commonwealth spends only $1,40Qper studentQess

than any U.S. state). Because of entrenched unemployment, out-migration
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has once again increased and was estimated at 280,000 from 1980 to 1988
(about 8.5 percent of the population).
It is against this backdrop of contradictory development outcomes that
the current status debate has to be understood. In reality, the U.S. government
has kept the colony economically afloat and politically stable. While it
developed fiscal tools to promote accumulation, it has had to allocate ever
larger amounts of public capital to sustain the material and social reproduc
tion of the colony. Given the nature of late capitalist expansion, which is
highly mobile and extremely sensitive to changes in factor costs, this federal
inteiVention to sustain minimal social standards is not surprising.
Puerto Rico's internationalized economy virtually precludes the Com
monwealth government from enacting socially responsible policies without
jeopardizing the investment climate. The combination of federal incentives
and Puerto Rico's giveaways to the multinationals sustains moderate ec<1nomic growth. This tenuous economic feature of the island's current rela
tionship vis-a-vis the United States has been skillfu lly exploited by the
statehood and independence activists. The colonial model is in crisis and it
is they, we are told, who offer a feasible way out of the dilemma.

The Senate and House bills
In the ensuing 22 years since the last plebiscite, status-related activity
has been uneventful and largely unnoticed by the public. Status bills were
routinely introduced in Congress, and invariably died inconspicuously in
various corrupittees. From 1976 to 1983, the pro-statehood PNP controlled
the insular government, but lacked a sufficient electoral mandate to risk
calling for a referendum on status. When the PPD returned to power in 1984,
it did so with a slim margin of victory and with a U.S. president who ha,d

endorsed statehood. The time, it seemed, was rtot propitious for resurreqing
the status issue.

Until now, Congress has avoided tinkering with the colonial formula.

In part, this is because a more competitive political party system has evolved

in Puerto Rico, which Congress has chosen to interpret as indecisiveness
among Puerto Ricans about their preferred status. However, since neither the
PNP nor the PPD commanded ovelWhelming electoral support, they didn't
push the status issue. Instead, each party attempted to extract more funds

from the federal government in order to expand its political bas� before
calling for a referendum.
But the most compelling reason for the U.S. government's inaction up
to the present is that a status change opens a virtual Paqd?ra's box of tough
policy issues. Puerto Rico has been a boon to U.S. firms and has been a key
Redefining Puerto Rico's Pol itical Status
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com�onent of
nati�nal security strategy. However, federal budgetary
defiats, endeffilc meffiaency and corruption by the insular administration
entrenched poverty, the internationalized nature of Puerto Rico's dependen
economy, continued international criticism of the United States for its colonial
policy, and numerous other factors encourag
_ ed Washington to revisit the
colonial question.
The federal government is intensely preoccupied with how each of the
status �ptions affects its geO-political objectives, federal financing, investment
�tra eg1es, an social conditions on the island.While the colony undoubtedly
�still a lu c:attve venture for certain sectors of U.S. capital and is presumably
Vltal to national defense, it is also a drain cin the U.S. Treasury. Puerto Rico's
dependence and economic growth shape the contours of its political elites'
appeals to the electorate. But each political party also wants to allay the u.s.
gov�ent's fears about growing budgetary deficits and about jeopardizing
�ti�nal security.The referendum debate has been shaped by these conflict
mg mterests and uncertain projections.
In contrast to almost two decades of inconsequential status activity,
1991 saw� flurry of action, culminating in two bills. The Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources approved Senate Bill 712 by a narrow
margin of 11 to 8, which indicated substantial skepticism-among the senators
about the merits of the legislation.'1:1 The bill, however, was not reported out
of the Agricultural Committee when the 101st Congress convened. The
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported the Puerto Rico
Self-Determination Act, HR 4765, favorably out of committee. Subsequently
HR 4765 was approved by the full House'of Representatives.

�

�

�

�

1bis most recent episode in the politics of status began in earnest when
Senators Johnston and McClure of the Senate Committee on Energy and
�
Na� Resources arrived in Puerto Rico on February 27, 1989. They came
to
draft legislation for a binding referendum on status witR the
pres1 ents of the three political parties.28 Each party president agreed to
subffilt status proposals to the Senate Committee. Three sets of public
hearings were held during the summer of 1989 in Washington and SanJuan
to refine and reconfigure the parties' status proposals. In November 1989
the Se�te Finance Committee held hearings'in Wastungton to consider th
finanaal components of the legislation, and plarmed to draft a report in March
1990.
During the summer hearings, Committee Chairperson Senator Joh n
ston cautioned that the effectS of any status change would have to be
revenu�neutral, meaning that a change in status could not entail federal
expenditures beyond current levels. He noted that because of "the harsh
fiscal reality facing Congress," it would "make budget 'neutrality' an objective

�cuss
�

�
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during its consideration" of the status options. It was Congress's intention,
Johnston intoned, to respect the wishes of the people of Puerto Rico and to
abide by the referendum results. Johnston also obsetved that while the
United States respected international law as it related t6 self�etermination
for the people of Puerto Rico, Congress would be ultimately guided by the
Constitution of the United States and applicable Supreme Court rulings.
Each party's proposal was scrutinized and challenged by the Senate
Committee and the Bush Administration.29 Seventeen of the 20 proposals in
the PPD project were rejected by the Committee. It rejected any changes in
current law that entailed a reduction or constraint in the exercise of congres
sional and Executive Branch powers over Puerto Rico. State Department
r(:!presentative Mary V. Mochary argued that the enhanced Commonwealth
proposal would create an unprecedented political status and" ... would grant
to Puerto Rico significant attributes of sovereignty which would be incom
patible with remaining part of the United States."" The State Department
objected to delegating to Puerto Rico any authority vested in the Executive
Branch by the Constitution. The PPD wanted assurances that Section 9.36
would be retained indefinitely. However, Treasury Department official Ken
neth W. Gideon instructed Congress that it "should make clear that tax
benefits such as Section 936 cannot be regarded as benefits that will last
indefinitely" but as incentives for investments subject to congressional revi
sion.'' In short, the U.S. government rejected all PPD proposals designed to
grant the Commonwealth limited autonomous powers.
Administration officials reacted most favorably to the statehood pro
posal, and repeatedly noted that statehood posed the least difficulty with
respect to the issues of concern to the Executive Branch. Nonetheless,
objections were raised over the use of Spanish in the U.S. District Court, tariffs
on imported coffee, the 200-rnile jurisdiction of territorial waters and the
provision for Congress to enact an omnibus bill that would "ensure that the
people of Puerto Rico attain equal social and economic opportunities with
the residents of the several states." Objection was also raised to-recognizing
Spanish as the official language of Puerto Rico.These proposals were quietly
dropped from the final versiop of the bill.While the PNP called for retaining
Section 936, the bill provides for a five-year phasing-out period.
Displaying solicitous and studious reflection, the Senate Committee
entertained the proposals of the Partido Independentista Puertorri¢tefio
(PIP). But despite its seemingly understanding demeanor, Washington offi
cials rejected one of the party's key proposals. They were emphatic that the
United States must retain a military presence in an "independent " Puerto Rico.
Brigadier General M.J. Byron testified "the Department of Defense considers
Puerto Rico as a strategic pivot point of major importance to U.S. national
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security" and recommended retaining all current key military installations.
Although he did not categorically reject the PIP's request for the United States
to recognize "the right of the people of Puerto Rico to strive toward the total
demilitarization of its territory," Byron cautioned that such a policy would
involve degradation of U.S. military capabilities and impose enormous
fmandal costs for the federal govemment.32
More to the point, the StateDepartment witness testified that "owing to
the strategic importance of existing military installations and operations in
Puerto Rico," the provision calling for the Republic of Puerto Rico to close its
tenitory to any and all military forces of foreign nations was "directly at odds
with U.S. global military interests-!'33 Given this resistance, the PIP was forced
to recognize the legitimate security interests of the United States and said the
issue of the military bases was negotiable.
Because of Puerto Rico's excessive reliance on multinational corpora
tions, the PIP called for a 25-year phasing-out period for Section 936. Senate
Bill 712, however, terminates the tax credit upon the proclamation of
independence and does not provide for alternative tax credits. Also rejected
was the PIP proposal for unrestricted free trade between Puerto Rico and the
United States. The Senate Coi'nmittee silnply approved a Joint Transition
Commission to develop provisions for governing trade relations, and merely
stated that Congress will consider negotiating mutual free-trade relations. The
notion that Congress should compensate Puerto Rico for over 90 years of
occupation was obviously anathema. The United States is willing to provide
block grants for a period of nine years, the actual amount of_which would
be negotiated by the Commission, but it is estimated to be about $3.8 billion
annually.
Despite the PIP's inability to extract major economic concessions from
the Senate, according to a congressional study Puerto Rico had a brighter
economic future as an independent republic than a state. The Congressional
Budget Office's report was the ftrst offidal U.S. government document that
acknowledged the economic viability of independence, noting "an indepen
dent Puerto Rico may be able to construct a set of incentives-through a
combination of tax-sparing treaties and local subsidies-that would ap
proach the attractiveness of current benefits under Section 936. "34 The study
observed that "The potential loss of investment under statehood is large, both
absolutely and compared with the fiscal benefits of ·statehood to Puerto
Rico."35
Throughout the legislative process Congress has rejected any role for
the United Nations in monitoring the referendum process. Senator Johnston
reasoned that, since the bill conforms to the PIP's proposal on the transfer of
sovereignty and self-determination, the United States has complied with the
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requirements of international law. Senators McClure andJohnstonfrequently
instructed witnesses that Puerto Rico is not a Golony and emphasized that the
resolution of Puerto Rico's status is strictly a domestic affair and not subject
to United Nations mediation. Their views were strongly endorsed by the State
Department, which claimed that Puerto Ricans had already exercised self
determination in 1952 and 1967.
The legislative process, as well as the substance of the bill, has been
widely criticiZed as predpitous, inherently anti-democratic, and palpably
colonial. Independence forces not affiliated with the PIP have repudiated
Senate Bill712 as an explidt violation of the prindples of self-determination.
Carlos Gallisa, president of the Partido Socialista Puertorriquefio (PSP),
provided one of the most dramatic moments in the hearings when he
challenged the very legitimacy of the referendum process. Gallisa called
upon the Senate Committee to recognize that Puerto Rico is a colony and
argued that, if it did not, "then nothing here will be resolved. And we will be
repeating the useless exerdse of 1967 and the celebration of another sham
election such as the previous one."36 He also called upon Congress to comply
with United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV), the "Magna Carta ofDecoloniza
tion."
Nora Matias Rodriguez, president of the Colegio deAbogados de Puerto
Rico, testified that Senate Bill 712 should be amended to provide for a
constituent assembly that would draw up an alternate proposal that conforms
to internationally accepted standards of self -determination. She called the
provisions for unrestricted and perpetual access to the territory of Puerto Rico
for military purposes a flagrant violation of these standards.57
The bill that came out of the Senate Committee contained a provision
forniaking the results of the referendum binding on Congress and committed
Congress to implementing the preferred solution (the self-executing provis
ions of the bill). In addition, the bill contained explidt definitions of the three
status options and the economic, political, and social obligations the federal
gov ernmentwould assume understatehood, independence, or an enhanced
Commonwealth.

The House bill
The House Subcommittee on Insular and International Affairs also held
hearings regarding the status of the island in Washington, in various dties in
Puerto Rico, and in New York. Rather than subjecting each status option to
the kind of rigorous ftseal analysis and political scrutiny conducted by the
Senate, the House Subcommittee chose to defer discussions of these and
other difficult issues until after the Puerto Rican people had expressed their
Redefining
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preferred option. The House favorably reported a bill out of committee that
differed markedly from that of the Senate. House majority leader Thomas

1b

'1

Foley and Morris Udall, chairman of the House Committee, had openly
expressed their opposition to the self-execution provisions of the Senate bill.

Puerto Rico's political parties tlireatened to boycott any referendum that

failed to include a self-executing provision, claiming that without such a
provision the referendum would be a mere beauty contest, totally at odds

with the principles of self-determination. However, the parties grudgingly
accepted a non-binding resolution after it became clear that the House would
refuse to enact legislation that included self-execution. The House bill further
differed in that it did not identify the status options. The electorate was
expected to indicate its preference for one of the three options, or "none of
the above."
'

.r
11

HR 4765 enumerated a three-stage process toward decolonization. The
first step was a non-binding vot� preference contest Next, the two
congressional committees would draft bills on the results of the referendum
in consultation with Puerto Rico's parties and the President by March 6, 1992.

Conclusion
This chapter began with a discussion of the nature of the c�lonial
process and the economic and political factors that led to the establishment
of the ELA as a redefined colony. Since 1952, Puerto Rico's economy has
been evolving in such a way as to weaken the role the Commonwealth

government plays in the capital accumulation process. The U.S. governm�t
has histori�y resisted granting Puerto Rico increased powers to manage Its

economy, instead enacting policies that encourage U.S. investments while

providing direct "band-aid" support to sustain those major sectors of the
population discarded by the process of distorted growth.

.

The legislative process associated with the passage of Senate Bill 712

and House Bill 4765 has been a conspicuous exercise in imperial power.

Congress has unilaterally decided that the proposed referendum conforms
to standards of international law.
Each of the three status proposals originally submitted by the political

parties has been emasculated to conform to the U.S. government's �tional

Finally1 the bill provided that the legislation reported by the Joint Committee

s ecurity concerns, and Congress's deliberations have been excessively influ

vote in Puerto Rico. The House bill also held out the option for further federal

adopted very different strategies in devising their legislation. The Senate

would become effective once the full Congress approved and in a second
government action if the electorate rejected the bill in the second vote.

By the end of October 1990, Puerto Rico's political parties were

clamoring for a status referendum bill. While each saw problems with the

House and Senate versions, the political leaders were committed to sustain

ing the referendum process. Only the PPD became skittish about the

referendum. Polls conducted by Puerto Rico's largest daily newspaper

revealed the deteriorating strength of the Commonwealth forces. By early
November 1990, only 34 percel).t of the electorate endorsed the Common

wealth option, while 41 percent of those polled favored statehood.38 On

November 17, the general leadership of the PPD in an extraordinruy meeting
essentially voted not to participate in the proposed 1991 referendum unless

enced by budgetary preoccupations. The Senate and House committees
publicly aired its position with respect to the parties' proposals. The H�use,

on the other hand, negotiated in private meetings and passed a relatively

noncontroversial bill that deferred substantive discussions until the Puerto
Rican people had advised Congress on their preference.

The referendum process made clear that the U.S. government is search

ing for a politically manageable and economical arrangement that

�

guarantee unrestricted military access to Puerto Rico and preserve the VItal

economic interests of U.S. firms. In the process, the competing interests of
different sectors of capital, the federal bureaucracy, Congress, and Puerto
Rico's political leadership (whose participation is required to lend a sem

blance of legitimacy to the process) hav<? all surfaced. This has hindered the

Congress approved legislation by Februruy 3, 1991. Moreover, the PPD did

negotiation process.

territoriality clause of the U.S. Constitution, that any status legislation,must

unworkable, the U.S. government has no intention of revising the existing

long-standing and finn opposition to recognizing Puerto Rico's sovereignty,

now, the U.S. government has not been able to devise a formula that is

the unthinkable by demanding that Puerto Rico be excluded from the

recognize the sovereignty of the Puerto Rican people. Given the Senate's
the PPD's decision to boycott the referendum halt contributed to the process.
By demanding an explicit recognition ofPue�o Rico's sovereignty, the PPD

was in reality postulating that itwanted to gain genuine autonomy for Puerto
Rico. In the process, it.drew much closer to advocating independence than
at any time since the late 1930s.
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The proceedings revealed that, while the prevailing colonial fonnula is

legislation to enhance the autonomous powers of the Commonwealth. Until

satisfactory to all those who have a stake in the status issue. Unless the
conflicting array of demands by political and economic forces is resolved,

the U.S. may wind up keeping its hobbled colony at least to the end of the
century.
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Postscript
In the 101st Congress, Senate Bill S712 and House Bill HR4765 were

reported out of the respective committees. HR4765 was approved in a floor
vote by the full House, but S712 was not reported out of committee before
the 101st Congress adjourned. When the 102nd Congress convened, the
House Committee introduced its original bill (retitled HR 244); the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Committee proposed an amended bill (S 244)
that excluded some controversial provisions of the original measure. But the
bill died in committee when proponents for the measure failed to obtain a
majority.
The status referendum process revealed a lack of consensus within the
federal government on whether to support congressional efforts to enact

has attained virtual parity with the PPD, and has at its disposal the resources
and technical expertise to generate support among key legislators in Wash
ington. While the party may not overcome what Senator Moynihan called a
nativist bias in the Senate, its presence makes any transformation qf the
curr.ent status unlikely. Unless the U.S. government is willing .to provide the
type of gu�rantees the independence party proposes for the Republic of
Puerto Rico, support for the statehood option will probably remain stable.
As long as the electoral basis of statehood remains strong, the prospects for
independence are nil.

status-related legislation. Congress was deeply divided on how to conduct
the referendum and how to implement the referendum results. Open resis
tance emerged to any legislation that would have conferred on the Common

wealth .autonomous powers in the areas on international commerce' trade

'

investment, employment, and international relations.
U.S. domestic political consideration, concerns about partisan recom
position of the legislature, antagonism to antidpated ethnidracial demo
graphic changes, and budgetary considerations all factored into the calculus
that led to a rejection of the status referendum legislation. Surprisingly,
however, the status hearings had revealed that neither the military nor the
national security apparatus publicly perceived that an independent Puerto
Rico would compromise U.S. geopolitical interests in the region.
The institutionalization of a highly competitive two-party system, in
which statehood proponents hold a slim majority over the advocates for
Commonwealth, also presented Congress with a dilemma . Any decoloniza
tion proposal had to address the reality that a sizeable portion of the U.S.
citizens living in Puerto Rico preferred statehood. Both the statehood PNP
and the CommonwealthPPD recognized the implications ofthis conundrum.
The" PPD, seeking to convince the U.S. government that Puertd Ricans had
an intense national cultural identity that would make annexation unaccept
able to the U.S. population, enacted legislation that established Spanish as
the official language of Puerto Rico, and sought public approval for changes
in the Puerto Rican constitution that codified the sanctity and distinctiveness

of Puerto Rican cultural identity. However, the PPD's campaign was repudi
ated by the electorate, and fortified the position of the statehood forces.
Nonetheless, the recomposition of the political party system generates
a new dynamic in the colonial formula. For three decades, from 1940 through
1968, Puerto Rico was essentially a one-party system. The statehood party
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